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Corporate Complicity in International Criminal Law:
Potential Responsibility of European Arms Dealers for
Crimes Committed in Yemen
Marina Aksenova†
Abstract: This article examines the question of corporate complicity
within the framework of international criminal law and, more specifically, at
the International Criminal Court (ICC). It does so by referencing a
communication to the ICC filed by several non-governmental organizations,
inviting the prosecutor to examine potential criminal responsibility of several
European corporate officials who are knowingly supplying weapons to the
United Arab Emirates/Saudi-led coalition currently engaged in a military
offensive in Yemen. This submission raises an important legal question of
whether the ICC’s Rome Statute provides for the possibility to hold corporate
officials accountable in cases of complicity in gross human rights and
humanitarian law violations. This article purports to answer this question by
scrutinizing two specific provisions of the Rome Statute: Article 25(3)(c),
which discusses aiding and abetting for the purpose of facilitating the
commission of a crime, and Article 25(3)(d), which criminalizes contributions
to the commission of a crime by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose.
Cite as: Marina Aksenova, Corporate Complicity in International
Criminal Law: Potential Responsibility of European Arms Dealers for Crimes
Committed in Yemen, 30 WASH. INT’L L.J. 255 (2021).

INTRODUCTION
The Yemen crisis is the world’s largest ongoing humanitarian
disaster. Since 2015, the conflict has cost over two hundred thousand
lives.1 Over twenty million people are experiencing food insecurity, of
which ten million are suffering from famine.2 Most media attention is
directed at the United Arab Emirates/Saudi coalition’s (UAE/Saudi-led
coalition) war crimes. Yet, European companies are arguably complicit
as well.3 Whether European company officials are complicit under the
Rome Statute is another question entirely. This article explores the
applicable test for complicity under the Rome Statute in the International
Criminal Court (ICC), as applied against the European arms trade to the
†
Marina Aksenova is a Professor of International and Comparative Criminal
Law at IE University in Madrid, marina.aksenova@ie.edu.
1
UN humanitarian office puts Yemen war dead at 233,000, mostly from ‘indirect
causes’, UN NEWS (Dec. 1, 2020) https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1078972.
2
Yemen, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2020/country-chapters/yemen# (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
3
Made in Europe Bombed in Yemen: How the ICC Could Tackle the
Responsibility of Arms Exporters and Government Officials, EUROPEAN CENTER FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS, https://www.ecchr.eu/fileadmin/Fallbeschreibun
gen/CaseReport_ECCHR_Mwatana_Amnesty_CAAT_Delas_Rete.pdf (last visited Feb.
10, 2021) [hereinafter Made in Europe].

256

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 30 NO. 2

UAE/Saudi-led coalition war in Yemen. Complicity is a form of
secondary liability that denotes responsibility to those not physically
perpetrating crimes, but who provide necessary assistance,
encouragement, or support.4 The term “corporate complicity”
encompasses both the responsibility of corporate entities and individuals
acting on those entities’ behalf.
Briefly, the ICC is an international court situated in the Hague.
It adjudicates questions of individual criminal responsibility for war
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and the crime of aggression.5
It is the successor court to several ad hoc tribunals—including the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)—that operated
in the 1990’s and built extensively on post-Nuremberg jurisprudence.6
The ICC model is based on permanency and a quasi-universal scope of
application. In contrast, its predecessors were limited temporally and to
specific conflicts.7 Not every state is a member of the ICC. Yet, its
judgments and decisions have far-reaching effects due to its ability to set
international law standards.8
Corporate complicity is deeply rooted in highly developed
international criminal jurisprudence.9 Post-Nuremberg case law and both
ad hoc and hybrid tribunal judgments support a definition of aiding and
abetting as “knowingly providing substantial assistance to the principal
perpetrator of the offense.”10 For instance, the IG Farben and Krupp
Nuremburg trials and the Zyklon B case were among the international
community’s first attempts at holding corporate officials accountable for

4
MARINA AKSENOVA, COMPLICITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 1 (2016).
5
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5 July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S 38544 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
6
See Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 57–97 (1999).
7
S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
8
Kenneth Anderson, The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and
Unintended Consequences, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L., 331, 331–358 (2009).
9
AKSENOVA, supra note 4.
10
Id. at 6. By “hybrid tribunals” I mean international courts created in late 1990’s
and early 2000’s following the ICTY and ICTR models but with active participation of
domestic authorities, such as, for instance, the Special Court for Sierra Leone or the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. See S.C. Res. 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000);
see also The Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea (“ECCC Law”), NS/RKM/0801/12 as amended in 2004 by
NS/RKM/1004/006.
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their complicity in crimes committed during the Second World War. 11
Logically, the next step is to interpret the Rome Statute as a mechanism
to hold corporate officials accountable for their complicity in
perpetuating war crimes. The Rome Statute also recognizes various
forms of secondary liability.12 Two provisions are particularly relevant.
The first is Article 25(3)(c), which establishes liability when the accused,
“for the purpose of facilitating” the commission of a crime, “aids, abets
or otherwise assists” in its commission.13 Second is Article 25(3)(d),14
which criminalizes knowingly contributing to the commission of a crime
by a group acting with a common purpose. 15
While it is clear that secondary liability has been thoroughly
developed in international criminal law,16 it appears that international
courts have applied the complicity standard mostly towards political and
military leaders’ conduct, rather than corporate officials’, except for the
Nuremberg trials and related cases.17 Only recently, non-governmental
organizations (NGO) and private individuals have begun attempting to
hold corporate officials accountable for gross human rights and
humanitarian law violations as well.18
In 2019, a group of NGOs filed a communication—akin to a
criminal complaint—with the ICC alleging that corporations were
contributing to war crimes in Yemen.19 The NGOs alleged that several
U.N. War Crimes Comm’n, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Volume X,
The
I.G.
Farben
and
Krupp
Trials,
at
72–85
(1949),
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-10.pdf; Zyklon B Case,
Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others, 1 Law Reports of War Criminals 93, 93–103 (British
Military Court, Mar. 1–8, 1946). See Brief for International Law Scholars, Former
Diplomats, and Practitioners as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Nestlé USA, Inc.
v. John Doe I, et al., 140 S.Ct. 912 (2020) (No. 19-416), 2020 WL 6292571 at *6
[hereinafter Nestlé v. Doe Amici Brief].
12
Nestlé v. Doe Amici Brief at 15, n.6.
13
Rome Statute art. 25(3)(c).
14
Rome Statute art. 25(3)(d).
15
Nestlé v. Doe Amici Brief at 15, n.6.
16
See e.g., ALBIN ESER, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 781–83
(Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002). See generally ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT, THE CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW (2003); GIDEON BOAS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW PRACTITIONER
LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2011).
17
See Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Appeals Judgment (Nov.
16, 2001).
18
JENNIFER ZERK, CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES:
TOWARDS A FAIRER AND MORE EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF DOMESTIC LAW REMEDIES, A
REPORT PREPARED FOR THE OFFICE OF THE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
90 (2013).
19
Made in Europe, supra note 3. These NGOs are the European Center for
Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), Mwatana, Rete Disarmo, Centre Delàs, the
11
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European arms suppliers were complicit in war crimes committed by the
UAE/Saudi-led coalition.20 More specifically, the communication
highlights that German, Italian, Spanish, French, and British companies
supplied the UAE/Saudi led coalition with fighter jets and other military
equipment used indiscriminately in attacks against civilians since March
2015, which arguably violate Articles 8(2)(c)(i), and 8(2)(e)(i), (ii), (iii),
and (iv) of the Rome Statute.21
It is important to note that current international criminal law
developments concern individual liability, rather than corporate
liability.22 Despite several domestic jurisdictions permitting corporate
criminal liability, international criminal law has continued to focus on
individual criminal responsibility ever since the initial war tribunals after
World War II.23 Notably, a French proposal to include corporate criminal
liability in the Rome Statute was denied when the document was
memorialized in July 1998.24 Article 1 of the Rome Statute established
the International Criminal Court, vested with “the power to exercise its
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international
concern.”25 The reference to “persons” in this provision stirred debate
due to an unresolved concern about the Court’s jurisdiction over natural
Campaign Against Arms Trade, and Amnesty International Secretariat. See ECCHR,
MADE IN EUROPE, BOMBED IN YEMEN: HOW THE ICC COULD TACKLE THE RESPONSIBILITY
OF ARMS EXPORTERS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (Feb. 2020), https://www.ecchr.eu/fil
eadmin/Fallbeschreibungen/CaseReport_ECCHR_Mwatana_Amnesty_CAAT_Delas_Re
te.pdf.
20
Id.
21
Rome Statute art. 8(2)(c)(i) (“Violence to life and person, in particular murder
of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture”); art. 8(2)(e)(i) (“Intentionally
directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not
taking direct part in hostilities”); art. 8(2)(e)(ii) (“Intentionally directing attacks against
buildings, material, medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive
emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law”); art. 8(2)(e)(iii)
(“Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles
involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians
or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict”); art. 8(2)(e)(iv)
(“Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art,
science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick
and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives”).
22
Rome Statute art. 25(1) (establishing jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court over natural persons).
23
U.N. War Crimes Comm’n, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Volume
X, The I.G. Farben and Krupp Trials, at 72–85 (1949),
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-10.pdf; Zyklon B Case,
Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others, 1 Law Reports of War Criminals 93, 93-103 (British
Military Court, Mar. 1–8, 1946).
24
Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Proposal
Submitted by France, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1998/DP.14 (Apr. 2, 1998).
25
Rome Statute art. 1.
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persons or corporate entities—a question decided in favor of natural
persons only—during the final conference in Rome.26 This result was
partially motivated by tradition: many states did not hold corporations
criminally liable, as opposed to civil liability.27 The Rome Statute’s
complementarity principle, which requires member states to have
compatible domestic criminal law with the Rome Statute, would have
thus preempted the ICC from exerting jurisdiction over corporations.28
Despite this apparent limitation, the Rome Statute contains two elaborate
articles on modes of liability—Article 25 and Article 28—that accords
prosecutors with the ability to attach responsibility to individuals,
including those acting on corporations’ behalf.29
This article analyzes and expands upon corporate complicity in
international criminal law through the Yemen case study; highlighted in
a Communication from the ECCHR to the ICC about European arms
dealers’ potential complicity in war crimes committed there. It engages
with Articles 25(3)(c) and 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute and
demonstrates that, despite differences in wording, recent ICC case law
points toward a general customary international law standard for aiding
and abetting.30 More importantly, this international law standard for
complicity may be applicable to corporate officials’ conduct as well. The
ICC plays a prominent role in creating customary international law.
Although customs are listed as a source of law at the ICC in Article
21(1)(b) of the Rome Statute,31 they play a lesser role at the Court than
in ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence.32 Instead of relying on customary
international law, the ICC primarily depends on the Rome Statute, which
has developed definitions of crimes and modes of liability. But this
independence does not preclude the ICC from building on the ad hoc
tribunals’ jurisprudence. The ad hoc tribunals’ law and the ICC’s law

26
U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Official Records of U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Vol. I), U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.1 (Rome, June 15–July 17, 1998); see also WILLIAM
A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE 63 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2016).
27
David Scheffer, Corporate Liability under the Rome Statute, 57 HARV. INT. L.
J. 35, 38 (2016) https://harvardilj.org/2016/07/corporate-liability-under-the-rome-statute/
28
Id.
29
Rome Statute arts. 25, 28.
30
See Manuel Ventura, Aiding and Abetting, in MODES OF LIABILITY IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 173, 190 (Jérôme de Hemptinne et al. eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2019) (arguing “[t]here is general consensus on the core requirements of
aiding and abetting”).
31
Rome Statute art. 21(1)(b).
32
DAPO AKANDE, SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 50 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
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diverge with respect to an accomplice’s requisite mental state and
contribution to the crime.33 Nonetheless, the individual cases’ factual
analysis may yield similar conclusions regarding what elements must be
satisfied in order to establish complicity.
The article proceeds as follows: Section I briefly explores the
nature of complicity and its functional core. This Section elucidates the
technical aspect of complicity and its purpose in criminal law. Sections
II and III then discuss the scope of Article 25(3)(c) and Article 25(3)(d)
of the Rome Statute and the elements implicit in their definitions. Section
IV discusses the ECCHR Communication to the ICC. This document
expressly invokes Article 25(3)(c) while claiming several European arms
dealers were complicit in war crimes committed in Yemen.34 The
Communication does not engage directly with Article 25(3)(d), but this
article speculates on the possibility of applying this distinct provision to
the conduct of corporate officials. Finally, Section V examines likely
objections to invoking these Articles to address corporate officials’
responsibility, which may prevent the Communication from proceeding
to the ICC’s preliminary examination and investigation stage.
I.

THE FUNCTION AND MEANING OF COMPLICITY

A working definition of complicity is necessary to understand
the ICC’s test for aiding and abetting criminal activity. Complicity
attributes criminal responsibility to those who do not physically
perpetrate the crime.35 Thus, the essential function of this legal notion is
to construct a link between the accomplice and the criminal act of another
person.36 This legal tool is indispensable because harm may result from
concerted actions committed by any number of parties with varying
degrees of spatial and temporal proximity to the ensuing result. Some
actors may be directly involved by perpetrating the crime. Others may
contribute by virtue of providing culpable assistance or encouragement
to the direct perpetrator.37
The nature and extent of criminal contributors’ assistance
varies, making complicity an umbrella term that may encompass
numerous actions. These actions include aiding and abetting, instigating,

33

AKSENOVA, supra note 4, at 81–176.
See Made in Europe, supra note 3.
35
AKSENOVA, supra note 4, at 1.
36
Id. at 9; KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 1998).
37
Marina Aksenova, Nestlé & Cargill v. Doe Series: Toward a Harmonized Test
for Complicity of Corporate Officials?, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 30, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/73608/nestle-cargill-v-doe-series-toward-a-harmonized-testfor-complicity-of-corporate-officials/.
34
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ordering, facilitating, soliciting, and/or inducing criminal activity.38
Jurisdictions around the world have varying laws with respect to what
constitutes complicity. Nonetheless, these differing laws retain the
concept’s functional core: attributing responsibility to parties other than
the immediate physical perpetrator of the crime.39 The complicity
doctrine and its equivalent exist in a variety of jurisdictions across the
world—at both the domestic and international levels—highlighting its
operative significance.40 The Rome Statute is no exception. Article 25(3)
clearly invokes the concept of complicity, as it deems an individual
responsible for a crime and liable for punishment if that person orders or
induces the crime,41 facilitates its commission,42 or contributes to its
commission in any other way.43
II. ARTICLE 25(3)(C) TEST
Pursuant to Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute:
A person shall be criminally responsible and liable for
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court if that person . . . [f]or the purpose of facilitating
the commission of such crime, aids, abets or otherwise
assists in its commission or its attempted commission,
including providing the means for its commission.44
This formulation includes two distinct elements that must be established
to prove secondary liability. They can be broken down into actus reus,
or the conduct requirement, and mens rea, or the fault requirement. The
conduct requirement and fault requirement are used in this article to
avoid confusion with the actus reus and mens rea of an underlying
offense that must be addressed separately.45
Under Article 25(3)(c), the conduct requirement consists of
facilitating the commission of a crime in the form of aiding, abetting, and
assisting in other ways.46 The list of potential forms of assistance is thus
open to interpretation based on each case’s factual circumstances.
Interestingly, the term “substantial,” which was added as a qualifier in

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

AKSENOVA, supra note 4, at 13.
See generally id.
Id. at 47.
Rome Statute art. 25(3)(b).
Id. art. 25(3)(c).
Id. art. 25(3)(d).
Id. art. 25(3)(c).
See id. art. 25(4).
AKSENOVA, supra note 4, at 154.

262

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 30 NO. 2

the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence,47 is missing from the description of
the nature of contribution in the Rome Statute.48 The ICC’s earlier
jurisprudence expressly utilized substantial assistance, seemingly
inferring the comparison of substantial assistance to the essential
contribution required under Article 25(3)(a).49 In contrast, more recent
cases did not use the substantial contribution test.50
ICC Trial Chambers have disagreed over whether this
requirement is implicit in the definition under Article 25(3)(c). 51 The
most recent case to discuss this issue is Bemba et al., where ICC PreTrial Chamber II expressly rejected the “substantial” qualifier. It found
that no specific quantitative threshold is needed because of the causality
requirement.52 The causality requirement was a way for the Bemba et al.
Chamber to explain that although the contribution need not be an
essential part of the crime, it must have “furthered, advanced or
facilitated the commission of such offence.”53 Therefore, the assistance
must facilitate the offense in some capacity; if it does not, then it does
not fall within Article 25(3)(c)’s ambit.54 The Bemba et al. case dealt
with Mr. Bembe Gombo’s offenses against the administration of justice
during his trial.55
While the Chamber correctly concluded that a quantitative
assessment of contribution is not necessarily helpful when evaluating the
nature of assistance, the judges’ engagement with causality is somewhat
confusing because causality, narrowly understood, refers to causing
events directly, not through another person.56 Given the general

47
Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 235 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/furun
dzija/tjug/en/fur-tj981210e.pdf.
48
SCHABAS, supra note 26, at 435–36.
49
Rome Statute art. 25(3)(a) provides for responsibility of a person who
“[c]ommits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another
person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible.” See Prosecutor
v. Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 279 (Dec.
16, 2011) (“essential contribution” discussion).
50
Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/13, Judgment Pursuant to Article
74 of the Statute, ¶ 35 (Nov. 11, 2014); Prosecutor v. Blé Goudé, ICC-02/11-02/11-186,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 167 (Dec. 12, 2014).
51
See Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10, ¶ 279.
52
Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/13, ¶ 35.
53
See id. para. 18.
54
Id.
55
Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/13, Case Information Sheet (Sept.
2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/Bemba-et-alEng.pdf.
56
Michael Moore, Causation in the Criminal Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 169 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., Oxford Univ.
Press 2011); Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the
Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 334 (1985).
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presumption in criminal law that a principal’s actions are free and
voluntary, it cannot be said that one who aids, abets, or otherwise
contributes, also caused the principal’s actions.57 However, the Chamber
correctly noted the need to establish a connection between the crime and
the assistance rendered, such that the accessory’s contribution must have
an effect on the commission.58 It is plausible that both the causality
requirement and the substantial contribution requirement refer to the
same legal problem of ascertaining this effect. Therefore, there is
arguably no clear divergence on this point between ICC case law and ad
hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence.
The second element of secondary liability under Article
25(3)(c) is the fault requirement. This requirement can be broken down
into the accomplice’s (1) attitude towards assisting the principal
perpetrator, which must be done purposefully, and (2)awareness of the
ensuing harm.59 “Purpose” in this provision is traditionally construed as
a departure from the general standard of knowledge, which is accepted
as a requisite element of aiding and abetting liability in the ad hoc
tribunals’ jurisprudence.60 The Bemba et al. Trial Chamber clarified,
however, that “purpose” as written in Article 25(3)(c) only refers to an
accessory’s facilitation of the offence, not the principal offence itself.61
This implies that no shared intent between the accessory and the primary
perpetrator is needed. For example, if the perpetrator intends to commit
genocide against certain part of the population, the accomplice need not
share this intention—it is sufficient that an accomplice provides
assistance knowing about the intention of the perpetrator. In contrast, the
ad hoc tribunals—the ICTY and the ICTR—require knowledge with
respect to both facilitation and the ensuing offence.62 There is therefore
some divergence in the applicable standard of aiding and abetting in
international law regarding the fault requirement. Nonetheless, the
Bemba et al. Chamber’s clarification that “purpose” only applies to the
act of facilitation diminishes this difference.

57
Andrew Ashworth & Jeremy Horder, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 24
(Oxford Univ. Press 7th ed. 2013).
58
Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/13, ¶ 35.
59
See Rome Statute art. 30(2) (outlining different elements of mens rea).
60
Kirsten Bowman, Commentary Rome Statute: Part 3, CASE MATRIX NETWORK
para. 270 (last updated June 30, 2016), https://www.casematrixnetwork.org/cmnknowledge-hub/icc-commentary-clicc/commentary-rome-statute/commentary-romestatute-part-3/.
61
Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/13, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74, ¶¶ 97–98
(indicating it is thus sufficient to intend to supply arms knowing these arms are used in the
commission of crimes).
62
See Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No IT-98-32-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 71 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2002).
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III. ARTICLE 25(3)(D) TEST
Pursuant to Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute:
A person shall be criminally responsible and liable for
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court if that person …[i]n any other way contributes
to the commission or attempted commission of such a
crime by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and
shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal
activity or criminal purpose of the group, where
such activity or purpose involves the commission
of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of
the group to commit the crime.63
Accomplice liability under Article 25(3)(d) is still in its early stages of
development.64 The Rome Statute’s drafters extensively discussed how
to establish individual responsibility for group criminality, which proved
to be a contentious topic.65 Some delegations insisted on the notion of
conspiracy enshrined in the Nuremberg Charter and the Tokyo Charter.66
Other delegations questioned the compatibility of conspiracy with the
principle of legality.67 This is due to the fact that conspiracy attributes
responsibility for an agreement to commit a crime as opposed to
criminalizing conduct resulting in actual harm.68 The resulting
compromise led to the adoption of Article 25(3)(d), which was borrowed
from the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings.69 Because the original article’s text was drafted in the context
63

Rome Statute art. 25(3)(d).
See AKSENOVA, supra note 4, at 156–64 (discussing the evolution of mode of
liability at the ICC).
65
Jens D. Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal
Enterprise, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 69, 78–88 (2007); Marjolein Cupido, Group Acting with
a Common Purpose, in MODES OF LIABILITY 310 (Jérôme de Hemptinne et al. eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2019).
66
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis art. 6(2)(a), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. Charter of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 5(2)(a), Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. 1589.
67
Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Rep. of the
Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, U.N. Doc. A/51/22, at
94–95 (1996).
68
See AKSENOVA, supra note 4, at 37, 56–61.
69
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings art.
2(3)(c), Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256.
64
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of state responsibility,70 it remains necessary to explore its application to
individuals on a case-by-case basis. However, the existence of a group
acting with a common purpose is a defining feature of Article 25(3)(d)
liability. Proving this element evidentially may be problematic, but
references to any meetings during which group members agree on the
crucial aspects of the plan or to public statements in which group
members express their intentions may assist in establishing the existence
of this element.71
The crucial distinction between contributing to a group acting
with a common purpose under Article 25(3)(d) and aiding and abetting
under Article 25(3)(c) is that the latter provision deals with contribution
to a specific crime, while the former covers contributions to a group
performed when the contributor had knowledge of the group’s intention
to commit crimes. For instance, supplying ammunition to a local militia
group known to be perpetrating war crimes in the area would be assisting
a group, whereas providing a specific location for civilian executions
would be assistance to the crime. Article 25(3)(d)’s emphasis is on the
assistance provided to a group engaged in criminality; Article 25(3)(c)
targets an individual facilitating an specific offence.72 In addition, Article
25(3)(c) calls for a higher standard of fault, as it requires purposeful
contribution to the crime. In contrast, Article 25(3)(d) applies the general
standard of intent, which is defined as “mean[ing] to engage in the
conduct.”73 Thus, intending to contribute to a group, while knowing that
group’s criminal intentions, sufficiently establishes Article 25(3)(d)
accomplice liability. Pursuant to Article 25(3)(d)(ii), the contributor does
not need an intent to assist with or contribute to a specific crime—they
need only have knowledge of that crime.74
Article 25(3)(d) liability requires proof of the following
elements: (1) a significant contribution, made with intention, to a group;
(2) the existence of a group acting with a common purpose to commit
crimes; and (3) the contributor’s awareness of the group’s intention to
commit the crime,75 or, alternatively, acting to further a group’s criminal
activities when they involve committing a specific crime.76 Crucially,
the alleged contributor must know the group’s intentions. This
70
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knowledge must be specific enough to account for individual instances
of criminality.77 The knowledge requirement is distinct from 25(3)(c)
liability that requires “purpose” to contribute to the crime. Alternatively,
25(3)(d) requires shared intent with the group members, while awareness
of the group committing specific crimes is less instrumental.78 Article
25(3)(d) therefore focuses on the defendant’s attitude towards group
activity as opposed to their attitude towards the crime under 25(3)(c). 79
The following paragraphs will elaborate on each of the elements outlined
above.
The first element, a significant contribution made with intention
to a group, poses the same challenges as the substantial contribution
qualifier adopted by the ad hoc tribunals under 25(3)(c). Finding a
significant contribution requires quantifying a contribution’s extent,
which is difficult. For instance, sending limited financial aid to a warring
party, and this party later using the money to purchase uniforms and
military vehicles would constitute a contribution to crimes later
perpetrated by the party, but would this assistance qualify as significant
enough to attract criminal responsibility? Measuring assistances’ effect
on the crime requires both an in-depth exploration of causation and
consideration of extenuating factors.80 Therefore, what constitutes
significant contributions has been left to judicial interpretation.
In Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, the Trial Chamber
purported to establish a formula for what “significant contribution”
implies: a contribution must either affect the occurrence of the crime or
the way in which it was committed.81 The Trial Chamber confirmed the
allegations that Germain Katanga – former leader of an armed group in
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) - facilitated the supply of
weapons used by the local Ngiti militia in their attack on Bogoro in the
DRC.82 The judges concluded that Katanga’s contribution to the crimes
committed in Bogoro was significant. Local Ngiti militia gained a
military advantage after Katanga facilitated their arms trade, allowing
the militia to carry out their attacks on civilians in Bogoro.83 This finding
demonstrates the importance of the connection between the contribution
and the crime rather than a specific type of assistance.
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Given the difference between formulation of intention in
Articles 25(3)(c) and (d), intentional contribution to a group may in
practice be easier to prove than purposeful contribution to the crime.
Article 25(3)(d) only requires awareness that the group commits
crimes,84 rather than purposefully assisting in furthering specific
criminal acts. Awareness can be evidenced by media and relevant
governmental or non-governmental organizations’ reports.85 However,
the differences between Articles 25(3)(c) and (d)’s fault requirements
have not yet been assessed in an actual case.
The second element—existence of a group acting with a
common purpose to commit crimes—requires the prosecution to prove
(1) a group exists, and (2) that group has a common purpose. The
Katanga Chamber clarified that a group’s common purpose may be
established spontaneously, and there is no requirement that it be arranged
or formulated formally.86 It may therefore be inferred from the group’s
concerted action.87
The third element, Article 25(3)(d) breaks down into two
distinct subjunctive parts: (1) the contributor must have an awareness of
the group’s intention to commit the crime or (2) the contributor must act
in furtherance of the group’s general criminal activities. 88 If the
contributor is aware of the group’s intention to commit the crime, the
prosecution must establish their knowledge for each crime the group
intended to commit. Knowledge may be inferred from the relevant facts
and circumstances.89 If the contributor acts in furtherance of general
criminal activities, the prosecution must prove the contributor’s specific
intent of “aiming to further the [group’s] common purpose,” but specific
knowledge regarding a specific crime is unnecessary.90
IV. CASE STUDY: RESPONSIBILITY OF EUROPEAN ARMS DEALERS FOR
CRIMES COMMITTED IN YEMEN?
The ECCHR Communication to the ICC invokes Articles
25(3)(c)’s and 25(3)(d)’s test for complicity with respect to corporate
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facilitation.91 It also alleges that corporate officials in Germany, Italy,
Spain, France, and the United Kingdom (signatories of the Rome Treaty
and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)) are complicit in humanitarian law
violations in Yemen for knowingly and purposefully aiding the
UAE/Saudi-led coalition in the commission of crimes therein.92 The
Rome Statute extends jurisdiction to states or territories where the
conduct took place and to the states where the accused is a national.93 It
is therefore not an impediment in the present case that neither Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, nor Yemen, have ratified the Rome Statute.
The war in Yemen started in 2014, when Houthi insurgents took
control of Yemen’s capital and largest city, Sana’a.94 The Houthi
insurgents overthrew the government of the Saudi-backed leader,
President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and installed their own rule in large
parts of the country.95 This takeover prompted a coalition of Gulf states,
led by Saudi Arabia, to launch a campaign of economic isolation and air
strikes against the Houthi insurgents in 2015.96 The Gulf states were
given logistical and intelligence support from major world powers,
including the United States.97 Other countries, most notably, Germany,
Italy, Spain, France, and the United Kingdom also supplied military
equipment to the Saudi-led coalition.98 The conflict’s parties exacerbated
what the United Nations referred to as the world’s largest humanitarian
catastrophe, with estimates of more than 200,000 people killed since
2015.99
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A. Applying Article 25(3)(c) to the Arms Traders’ Actions
The ECCHR Communication revealed the difficulty in
connecting corporate actions with their eventual criminal result under
Article 25(3)(c)’s conduct requirement.100 In these arms dealing cases,
the most convincing evidence of that connection is showing the
European supplied munitions found around crime scenes across Yemen.
This is not an easy task from an evidentiary perspective considering
collecting evidence on the ground after an aerial attack is challenging.101
However, there are alternative ways to establish the connection
between the weapons suppliers and the crimes. For example, the
weapons’ supply chain paper trail, elucidating their final delivery
destination, may be sufficient evidence. Additionally, a contributor’s
encouragement of criminal activity could also qualify as assistance
affecting the crime. Their encouragement could be demonstrated by
continuing to deliver weapons to the UAE/Saudi-led coalition. If a
corporate official continues to authorize weapons supplies over an
extended period, while simultaneously providing maintenance for the
distributed equipment, this engagement may be used as evidence of
encouragement or moral support. Moral encouragement qualifies as
assistance.102 Thus, even without evidence of complete weapons’ supply
chains, the connection between assistance and the crime(s) can still be
proven. In proving encouragement, the element of continuity, as opposed
to destination, is key.
The fault requirement contains two elements that can be
demonstrated showing that the contributor (1) had some level of
awareness of the war crimes committed in Yemen and (2) acted
purposefully to facilitate these crimes.103 The general awareness element
is easier to prove, considering the plethora of publicly available
documents related to the conflict.104 Although, this element raises a
question regarding the requisite specificity of awareness: do corporate
officials need to know the exact crimes perpetrators committed using
their supplied equipment, or is general awareness sufficient? The
Furundžija Trial Chamber at the ICTY addressed this issue, holding that
awareness regarding “one of a number of crimes that will probably be
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committed” is sufficient.105 Therefore, the general test of whether a
contributor had the requisite specific accessorial knowledge is whether
the offence committed was within the contemplated range of offences.
In the situation of weapons’ supplying, the knowledge of war crimes
directed against Yemeni civilians should suffice.
The fault requirement’s second element—acting with “purpose
to contribute”—is arguably more difficult to prove with respect to
corporate officials’ actions. While it is true that shared intent between
the contributor and the physical perpetrator is not needed, as the Bemba
et al. Chamber clarified,106 it can still be evidentially challenging to
prove an individual’s conscious choice to contribute to the crime as
opposed to their mere awareness that their contribution will help in some
way.107 However, the “purpose to contribute” requirement does not
demand that facilitating the crime must be the actor’s sole purpose. It is
therefore possible that an accomplice may be primarily motivated to act
out of financial interests and still be said to be acting with a “purpose to
contribute.” Corporations seeking financial gain can demonstrate the
existence of an actor’s mental state if they voluntarily and consciously
choose to contribute. Corporations often knowingly continue their
operations despite access to information that discusses gross human
rights and/or humanitarian law violations, and they also typically renew
contracts with parties who remain actively engaged in criminal conduct.
Therefore, continuous renewals of weapons supply contracts with the
UAE/Saudi-led coalition may be an indicator of the “purpose to
contribute” element being satisfied. What is particularly relevant in this
regard is the pattern of renewals, which can demonstrate the consistency
of intention to keep up business activity despite possible humanitarian
law implications.
B. Applying Article 25(3)(d) to Arms Traders’ Actions
Applying Article 25(3)(d) to corporate officials’ actions in the
context of arms trade aligns in some ways with the elements required by
Article 25(3)(c), while also presenting unique challenges. First, an
additional element must be established—the crimes must be committed
by a group.108 Therefore, the existence of such a group must be proven.
Whether the attacks on Yemen by the UAE/Saudi-led coalition can be

105
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conceptualized as a “a crime by a group” when the focus of its activity
is portrayed as humanitarian intervention or general war efforts is an
open question. The answer depends on how broadly the ICC interprets
this criterion if the court ever examines this question or another
comparable one.
Second, the assistance’s effect on the crime must be established.
The Trial Chamber in Katanga stressed that significant contribution
implies that an individual’s assistance has some effect on the crime’s
commission. Therefore, it is fundamental that the contribution is
connected to the crime, rather than merely the group’s general
activities.109 Conduct that is immaterial to the offence’s commission falls
outside the scope of this provision.110 It is arguably possible that
corporate officials contributed to war crimes in Yemen by virtue of
supplying weapons to the UAE/Saudi-led coalition. These officials’
ongoing engagement with actors in Yemen constitutes tacit
encouragement of these actions. Another vital criterion for assessing
contribution is the position of the person vis-à-vis the group the
committing crimes. For example, public statements from corporate
leaders to the media can help prove a contribution’s effect on the crime.
If a company director speaks publicly about the company’s activities in
the relevant region and mentions an entity or a group known to be
responsible for implementing policies that have resulted in crimes on the
ground, these statements can be taken as a proof of the corporation’s tacit
encouragement of the group’s activities.
Third, proof of intentional contribution to a group must be
established under the fault requirement. The test for intent under Article
25(3)(d) is arguably more lenient than the test under Article 25(3)(c).
That is because 25(3)(d) is guided by the general standard contained in
Article 30(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, which is defined as ‘meaning to
engage.’111 How this test would be applied in practical terms and whether
a mere understanding that one’s conduct is instrumental to the group
remains unsettled. Under the existing guidance of Mbarushimana,
purposeful engagement must be coupled with at least a general
awareness that the conduct in question has contributed to responsible
group’s activity.112 In the context of the Yemeni conflict, this would
require proving that weapons’ suppliers intended to facilitate the
activities of a coalition with the knowledge that crimes are being
109
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committed. The emphasis is on the attitude towards the group rather than
the specific crimes committed by this group.
Finally, there are two subsections within Article 25(3)(d).
Article 25(3)(d)(i) focuses on the specific intent aimed at furthering the
group’s criminal activity,113 while Article 25(3)(d)(ii) requires
knowledge of group’s intention to commit specific crimes.114 Thus, the
first clause calls for a shared intent between the contributor and the group
to commit a crime, while the second clause requires a contribution to the
specific crime, meaning that clear links must be made to specific
criminal incidents. Demonstrating responsibility under Subsection (ii)
appears more plausible in the arms trading cases. Contribution may be
proved under Article 25(3)(d)(ii) by furnishing documentary evidence of
contractor-supplied ammunition found at the crime scene, for example,
coupled with proof of the awareness by the companies’ officials that
these specific raids were ongoing. This exercise is similar to what would
be undertaken to prove complicity under Article 25(3)(c). In contrast,
arguing for corporate officials’ complicity under Subsection (i) requires
proof that an accomplice aimed to further the common purpose of the
group, which may be more difficult to obtain or furnish in court.
V. COUNTERARGUMENTS: STATE AUTHORIZATIONS AND THE
DIRECTION OF THE SUPPLIES
There are several possible objections that potential accomplices
in the corporate sector may advance in response to accusations of
liability for arms trading, with respect to both the fault and the conduct
requirements. These concerns apply to both Article 25(3)(c) and Article
25(3)(d).
A. State Authorization of Weapon Exportation
One objection to the fault requirement concerns the requirement
that states must authorize all weaponry exportation. The weapons market
is a highly regulated business, and it requires licenses that grant certain
companies the right to export military equipment.115 States are also
bound by two crucial international and regional instruments that outline
the conditions they must abide by to allow weapons exports.116 It is
therefore important to establish the key criteria that must be considered
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when states grant authorizations and how these authorizations relate to
business activity.
The first significant document setting out these criteria is the
ATT, which came into force on December 24, 2014.117 The ATT is a
multilateral treaty that stipulates states’ obligations when it comes to
arms control. This legally binding document is, however, relevant to this
discussion because state authorizations issued in compliance with the
requirements of the ATT may be invoked by arms suppliers as a possible
defense to culpability of corporate officials. It is therefore crucial to
examine the conditions under which states grant such authorizations. The
implication of this discussion is that state due diligence does not alleviate
the need for corporate due diligence when it comes to arms supplies. The
United Nations Guidelines for Business and Human Rights impose an
obligation on how business enterprises should carry out human rights’
due diligence,118 however the extent to which these principles are
binding remains open to debate.119 Thus, corporate officials are still
under an obligation to conduct independent and case-specific due
diligence regarding each weapon delivery, even after they have been
granted the general arms export license.
The ATT is the primary legal document regulating international
arms trade at the state level,120 and it is also the first comprehensive treaty
addressing this issue of global concern.121 When the treaty was written,
it was ratified by 109 states; 31 additional states have signed the treaty
but have not yet ratified it.122 The ATT was initiated in 2006 by the
United Nations General Assembly Resolution.123 The Resolution
recognized that the absence of common international standards for the
transfer of conventional arms contributed to armed conflict, the
displacement of people, crime, and terrorism.124 This regulatory gap thus
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undermined peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability, and
sustainable social and economic development on a global scale.125
Identifying this pressing problem prompted the United Nations General
Assembly to start the process of examining the feasibility of a thematical
treaty.126 The process resulted in the ATT’s adoption on April 2, 2013.127
The United States, the world’s top weapons supplier, initially
signed the treaty but revoked its binding effect in 2019.128 The ATT was
therefore never legally binding on the United States because it never
went through the ratification process, which is required to activate the
treaty domestically. Nonetheless, other large exporters of arms,
including France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Italy, have
signed and ratified the ATT.129 According to data gathered by the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the world’s fifteen
largest arms companies as of 2019 were all headquartered in one of these
states.130 Nationals from each of these five countries are thus under
scrutiny in the NGOs’ Communication. By ratifying the ATT, these
states have shown their intention to subject their nationals to
international review.
The ATT’s primary purpose is to establish the highest possible
common standards for regulating international trade in conventional
arms, which includes combat aircrafts, missiles, large-caliber artillery
systems, warships, and other items.131 However, there is also another,
subtler, underlying rationale for the treaty: to prevent arms from falling
into the wrong hands and thereby to reduce human suffering.132 The ATT
aims to accomplish its goal of establishing high standards for regulating
arms trade by requiring exporting countries to carry out a thorough and
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comprehensive risk assessment before engaging in trade.133 This
evaluation procedure includes examining the risk of human rights
violations in the destination country,134 the risk of diversion of the
exported arms,135 and the possible adverse impact on internal and
regional stability.136 Additionally, countries are obligated to report their
arms exports and imports annually.137
Article 6 of the ATT deals specifically with conventional arms
transfer authorizations by the state. It covers a variety of possible
scenarios, including a ban on authorizing transfers that violate Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter,138 created by the United Nations
Security Council, and specifically, arms embargoes.139 An arms embargo
has been instated in connection to the conflict in Yemen; however, the
embargo only concerns the weapons transfers to the Houthi rebel
groups—not the UAE/Saudi-led coalition.140 Article 6 also prohibits the
supply of arms when such action would violate the state’s relevant
international obligations under international agreements to which it is a
party, such as those relating to the transfer of, or illicit trafficking in,
conventional arms.141 This norm attempts to cover any activity that falls
short of the ATT’s specific obligations. It also tries covering activity
from other instruments relating to arms control, such as the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, or
the Chemical Weapons Convention.142
Article 6, Clause 3 of the ATT refers more specifically to the
Yemen crisis. In this provision, which prohibits authorizations of any
transfer of arms in there is knowledge that arms would be used to commit
war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, the ATT implies a
certain level of compliance with international humanitarian law
norms.143 It is therefore mandatory to refuse an authorization license in
133
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cases when weapons are used to commit war crimes, crimes against
humanity, or genocide. Notably, Article 6(3) requires having express
knowledge that the weapons will be used to commit crimes at the time
the license is granted.144 An earlier draft of this same provision
prohibited granting licenses “for the purpose” of facilitating the
commission of international crimes.145 This initial phrasing required an
even higher threshold of the fault requirement for the supplying state.
The original text was updated to reference knowledge rather than
purpose due to the difficulty in demonstrating that a state supplies
weapons to intentionally facilitate the commission of international
crimes.146 Arguably, the same problem is posed by the requirement of
purpose contained in Article 25(3)(c) as it applies to the actions of
corporate officials.
The knowledge requirement that was ultimately adopted in
Article 6(3)’s text remains tricky to prove when it comes to presenting
factual evidence. The degree and specificity of such knowledge remains
to be defined on a case-by-case basis by the judicial bodies applying or
interpreting the ATT in the future. One practical pitfall of this
generalized definition of knowledge is that arms export licenses usually
cover a range of products to be delivered over a course of months or even
years. The resulting lack of specificity in licenses may allow the recipient
state to plausibly argue that the supplies it sends are to be used to pursue
legitimate aims, such as enhancing state security. At the same time, it
could also be argued that a certain portion of the delivered weapons and
ammunition might eventually be diverted toward the commission of war
crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide over this period of time. It
is thus difficult for the ATT state party authorities to exercise the proper
degree of scrutiny and vigilance when granting export licenses, as there
are multiple factual scenarios that could result. Obligations under the
ATT raise many issues related to states’ potential responsibility and state
officials granting licenses with the knowledge of potential violations.
These issues, however, lie outside the scope of this article that deals with
responsibility of corporate officials.
The ATT provides an additional safety net concerning the
requisite knowledge of the granting state party.147 Even if the authorities
of the supplying state do not meet the standard for awareness given under
Article 6(3), Article 7 requires that the authorities still assess the
potential consequences and/or serious violations of international
144
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humanitarian law that the conventional arms could be used to commit.148
If, after conducting such an assessment and considering available
mitigating measures, the exporting state party determine that there is an
overriding risk of consequences, they may not authorize the export.149
The ATT therefore requires a high level of inspection prior to authorizing
weapons’ exports, because it includes both the investigating any
knowledge of actual crimes being committed with said weapons as well
as assessing the risk of the commission of these crimes.
Before the ATT was entered into force, arms trade regulation
was patchy, as there were minimal guidelines even in force. The 2008
European Union Council Common Position on arms export controls
(E.U. Council Common Position)150 and the 2006 Economic Community
of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons,
Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials were among the only
binding regional documents available prior to the ATT.151 There were
other regional guidelines for controlling arms transfers, such as the 2005
Central American Integration System Code of Conduct of Central
American States on the Transfer of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and
Other Related Material,152 the 2005 Best Practice Guidelines for the
implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol on
Small Arms and Light Weapons,153 and the 2000 Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Document on Small Arms
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and Light Weapons,154 among others,155 but none of these guidelines
were binding on the parties.
All five states under examination in the NGOs’ Communication
to the ICC are bound by the E.U. Council Common Position.156 The E.U.
Council Common Position contains obligations that are similar to those
enshrined in the ATT. It requires that European Union member states
assess the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles of
international humanitarian law and deny the country’s export license if
there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be
exported might be used in the commission of serious international
humanitarian law violations.157 Despite the similarities between the ATT
and the E.U. Council Common Position, the latter arguably contains a
more stringent obligation to assess and closely scrutinize potential risks
arising out of arms supplies than the ATT. The E.U. Council Common
Position requires the risk of serious violations of international
humanitarian law to be “clear,” while the ATT refers to an “overriding”
risk, arguably pointing towards a more flexible approach.158
Lastly, it is important to address the domestic regulation of arms
trade: each member state referred to in the NGOs’ Communication to the
ICC has adopted their own national laws for arms exports based upon
the obligations stemming from the E.U. Council Common Position and
the ATT.159 These laws identify the specific competent authorities in
each country who are responsible for granting or rejecting arms export
licenses and what additional conditions may apply beyond the provisions
of the ATT and the E.U. Common Position.160 National implementation
of international arms trade regulations has given rise to significant
differences among domestic licensing practices of the European Union
Member States.161 The European arms exports to members of the
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UAE/Saudi-led coalition involved in the conflict in Yemen has made this
disparity especially apparent.162 Thus, a diverse regulatory landscape
exists in the arms trade at both the international and national European
level. These disparities and gaps in regulation between states thus result
in excessive flexibility in how governments comply with the rules that
prohibit arms exports authorization when there is a risk of international
human rights or humanitarian law violations.163 As corporations continue
to supply weapons to warring parties, it is evident that this regulatory
divergence has trickled down and now muddles the standard of
responsibility for not only state actors, but for corporate actors as well.
This is so because the existence of state authorizations has direct impact
on the ability of corporations to conduct their activities and justify
continuation of their supplies.
B. Specific Direction of Supplied Aid
A second possible objection that corporate officials could raise
relates to aid supplied to the UAE/Saudi-led coalition. If the weapons’
deliveries are administered primarily to meet legitimate objectives, and
only a small fraction of the military equipment ends up being used in air
raids in Yemen that result in the loss of civilian life, is it plausible to
argue that the assistance had no effect on the perpetration of the specific
crimes? The ICTY jurisprudence has addressed this issue to some extent,
through the concept of “specific direction.”164 The ICTY rejected this
additional criterion, although it may still be revived in ICC
jurisprudence. The main reason the issue was raised in the ICTY initially
was to address the problem of “distant aid,” namely situations where
there is a large temporal or spatial gap between the assistance and the
ultimate harm. It is precisely the situation with arms supplies. It is
therefore plausible that questions related to aids’ direction might arise in
the context of corporate responsibility in general and arms supplies in
particular.
The ICTY’s discussion of the “specific direction” of supplied
aid began in 2013, in Prosecutor v. Perišić and Prosecutor v. Stanišić
and Simatović.165 In both cases, the defendants were acquitted on the
162
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Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013); Prosecutor v. Stanišić, Case No. IT-0369-T, Judgement (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 30, 2013); see also
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. 03-1-A, Judgement on Appeal, ¶ 473 (Special Court of
Sierra Leone Sept. 26, 2013).
163

280

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 30 NO. 2

grounds that their assistance with the specific offences at issue lacked
specific direction.166 More concretely, the Perišić Appeals Chamber
found that the traditional test, which provides that aid given with the
awareness that it would have a substantial effect on crimes committed in
the context of war, was insufficient to create individual criminal
responsibility in situations where the accused’s assistance was remote
from the principal perpetrators’ actions.167 The Chamber reasoned that,
in these cases, the conduct element of aiding and abetting must be
interpreted more restrictively so that it only refers to acts directed at
criminal behavior, rather than towards the general war effort.168 The
Chamber went on to explain that it is necessary to establish “a direct link
between the aid provided by an accused individual and the relevant
crimes committed by principal perpetrators.”169 The judges subsequently
overturned Momčilo Perišić’s conviction for aiding and abetting the
Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS) in his capacity as Chief of the
Yugoslav Army General Staff.170 The Appellate Chamber made this
decision notwithstanding the fact that Momčilo Perišić, as the most
senior figure in the Yugoslav Army, knowingly provided logistical and
personnel assistance to the VRS, which was committing serious crimes
in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.171
Other chambers responded to this new and heightened
interpretation of aiding and abetting quickly. In 2014, the Appeals
Chamber rejected the novel requirement of specific direction in
Prosecutor v. Šainović et al.172 However, one year later, in Prosecutor v.
Popović et al., Vinko Pandurević’s defense team nonetheless attempted
to revive the Perišić interpretation of aiding and abetting.173 The defense
argued that the defendant’s lawful actions were not specifically directed
towards the unlawful removal of civilians from their residences.174 The
Appeals Chamber once again dismissed this claim, maintaining that
specific direction is not an element of aiding and abetting under
customary international law.175 After a brief moment of fame, the
requirement of specific direction was conclusively rejected by the ICTY.
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The ICTY caveat for specific direction of aid or assistance can therefore
not be used as a possible counterargument by the suppliers of weapons
to UAE/Saudi-led coalition.
While the ICTY has spoken definitively, the ICC does not
appear to have conclusively addressed this issue. It is important to
ascertain whether the ICC may adopt the requirement of the specific
direction in its future jurisprudence. When discussing assistance under
Article 25(3)(c), the Bemba et al. Chamber held that a person’s
contribution does not need to meet any particular threshold, but instead
must have causal connection to the crime.176 The interpretation of
causality given is that “the assistance must have furthered, advanced, or
facilitated the commission of such offence.”177 As discussed above, this
understanding of causality is somewhat elusive when it comes to any
form of complicity. Secondary liability entails responsibility for
assisting another person who is presumed to have full autonomy over
making the decision to perpetrate the crime.178 Thus, regardless of
whether assistance is quantified in terms of substantiality, this
interpretation of causality does not definitely resolve the question of the
direction of aid. However, the ICC Trial Chamber did hint towards the
direction the Court is leaning by pointing to the elevated fault
requirement under Article 25(3)(c), which filters out contributions not
sufficiently linked to the crime.179 This is a welcome observation. A lack
of directness for the aid may be met with enhanced scrutiny of the
accused’s mental state: generic assistance becomes culpable when there
is knowledge about the crime as well as an understanding of the potential
effects of the rendered help.180
Article 25(3)(d) poses a similar challenge with respect to the
level of necessary contribution and its direction. Arguably, the direction
of the aid becomes even more important if assistance to the group is
discussed. There is an additional level of detachment between the act of
facilitation and the eventual crime. In the early Mbarushimana decision,
the majority of judges held that a contribution to the commission of the
crime by a group acting with a common purpose must be at least
“significant.”181 When deciding on the appropriate threshold, the
Chamber drew its inspiration from the ad hoc tribunals decisions
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regarding the joint criminal enterprise.182 In the later Katanga judgment,
the ICC Trial Chamber established a formula for assessing a significant
contribution.183 However, in both Mbarushimana and Katanga, the
judges added that the assessment must be done on a case-by-case basis,
taking into account such factors as sustained participation after learning
about a group’s criminality, efforts made to prevent criminal activity,
and the role of the accused vis-à-vis the crimes.184
In practical terms, the Katanga majority found that Germain
Katanga, the defendant, made a significant contribution to crimes
committed in the Bogoro region of the Democratic Republic of Congo
when he supplied arms to the local militia.185 Katanga’s logistical
support allowed local militia to gain military advantage and carry out its
plan to attack the civilian population.186 Judge van den Wyngaert
dissented on this point, arguing that Katanga’s aid could have been used
for criminal and non-criminal aims alike.187 She maintained that while it
is possible that a group within the meaning of Article 25(3)(d) may
simultaneously have criminal and non-criminal purposes, the criminal
component must be an inherent part of the common plan.188
Consequently, an accomplice must be at least aware that they are
contributing to the criminal activities of the group.189 This narrower
interpretation in the dissenting opinion arguably aligns somewhat with
the ICTY’s ‘specific direction’ interpretation of aiding and abetting. The
interpretation could therefore possibly be invoked by arms suppliers as a
potential defense to a claim that they are complicit in assisting the
UAE/Saudi-led coalition in Yemen in the commission of crimes
resulting from aerial campaigns under Article 25(3)(d). It may be
difficult, if not impossible, to prove that the weapons delivered by the
corporations under scrutiny were indeed distributed to the coalition
specifically with the aim of furthering their criminal activities.
In sum, the ICC jurisprudence does not appear to embrace the
requirement that supplied assistance must be directed specifically toward
criminal goals. A more nuanced interpretation of the assistance’s nature
in the context of corporate facilitation may emerge in future cases, since
182
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it is a sui generis scenario where the primary motivation is profitmaking. Generic assistance is thus the default defense for most, if not all,
companies who are potentially contributing to gross violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law.
CONCLUSION
This article explored potential corporate officials’ complicity
under the Rome Statute. This discussion is particularly timely given an
increased global focus on corporate involvement in gross human rights
and humanitarian law violations. Understanding the appropriate standard
for holding corporate executives accountable is helpful for the
development of international law that can address modern challenges.
The analysis has shown that while some divergence can be
identified between the ad hoc tribunals’ test of knowingly providing a
substantial contribution and the ICC’s test of a purposeful contribution,
there exists a clear thread harmonizing these two conceptualizations.
First, both interpretations identify the concept of complicity as a mode
of liability to attribute responsibility to those who do not directly
perpetrate the crime. Second, the conduct requirement of a contribution
that has some effect on the crime is comparable in both definitions. One
could even argue that the absence of the quantitative substantial qualifier
in the ICC’s interpretation is somewhat balanced by the enhanced fault
requirement of ‘purpose’. Third, in practical terms, a conscious choice
to contribute, or ‘facilitating for the purpose of commission,’ may be
established based on the same factual evidence as knowingly
contributing to the crime. The pattern of continued assistance may be key
in this regard. Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute poses unique
challenges as it also requires the existence of a group acting with a
common purpose to be proven. As discussed, this element has only been
addressed on a case-by-case basis, and it remains to be seen how the ICC
will approach the problem of corporate assistance provided to a group in
situations when such help can be used for criminal and non-criminal aims
alike.
Important questions remain unresolved regarding the standard
of corporate complicity within the ambit of international criminal law. It
is fair to say that, despite certain deviations in the legal test for complicity
between ad hoc tribunal and ICC jurisprudence, the recent filing by the
ECCHR and other non-governmental organizations demonstrates the
possibility of refining this test as it pertains to corporate officials’
actions.

